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This special issue of the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is a collection of 10 papers
presented at a workshop on Complexity in Economics and Finance, held at the Lorentz center in
Leiden, the Netherlands, on October 22-27, 2007.
The benchmark approach to economic and ﬁnancial economic theory is to assume the existence
of a fully rational, representative agent that exists inside an economy with complete markets. In
dynamic settings, this approach typically assumes that the representative agent maximizes her ex-
pected lifetime utility subject to a (perceived) budget constraint. One implication is that optimizing
agents will be forward-looking, and hence, there will be a crucial role for expectations in individual
decisions. It follows that depending on the nature of expectations, macroeconomic and ﬁnancial
outcomes will be impacted by the beliefs of agents.
Although expectations play a primary role in macroeconomic and ﬁnancial outcomes, there is no
consensus on how agents actually form expectations. The Rational Expectations (RE) paradigm,
still the benchmark model in economics, assumes that agents’ subjective expectations are consistent
with the actual stochastic process generated by those beliefs. A large literature questions the RE
hypothesis on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, it can be argued that RE are
not realistic because of the strong cognitive and computational assumptions required for agents’
beliefs to be rational. To actually compute rational beliefs, agents would need to know the precise
structure and laws of motion for the economy, even though this structure depends on agents’ beliefs
(c.f. Evans and Honkapohja (2001)). Moreover, rational expectations models often may possess
multiple equilibria, on which individual agents must coordinate. Empirical studies have shown that
survey data and macroeconomic data are not consistent with rational expectations. Mankiw, Reis,
and Wolfers (2003) and Branch (2004) show that survey data on inﬂation expectations exhibit a
wide degree of time-varying heterogeneity that can not be generated by a representative rational
expectation. Milani (2007) ﬁnds that a simple New Keynesian model where rational expectations
are replaced by an adaptive learning rule is preferred by the data to the best ﬁtting model solved
under the assumption of rational expectations. The standard economic approach also fails to explain
many important features of economic systems, e.g., the emergence of speculative bubbles and crashes
in ﬁnancial markets, fat tails, long memory and clustered volatility in the returns distribution of
1ﬁnancial assets and nonlinear mean-reverting dynamics of asset prices, see e.g., extensive surveys
of LeBaron (2006), Hommes (2006) and Lux (2008).
These ﬁndings suggest that a promising avenue for research is to replace the representative
agent, rational expectations framework with heterogeneous, boundedly rational agents. The pri-
mary question addressed by this literature is whether a model of heterogeneous bounded rationality
will support the predictions of the rational expectations paradigm, and if not, what are the implica-
tions of a more reasonable model of expectation formation. Another alternative research program is
a complexity approach that views markets as complex evolving systems. The complexity view em-
phasizes non-equilibrium price adjustments through the interaction of many heterogeneous agents.
According to this view, aggregate market outcomes are thought of as emerging properties of complex
systems.
Research on complexity in economics and ﬁnance is characterized by an interdisciplinary ap-
proach, attracting a number of distinguished scholars from physics, mathematics, computer science,
economics and psychology, and using tools developed in statistical physics, chaos and bifurcation
theory, theory of nonlinear stochastic processes, laboratory experiments with human subjects and
agent-based simulation techniques. A broad spectrum of approaches and viewpoints was a deﬁn-
ing feature of the workshop Complexity in Economics and Finance. The 10 papers of this special
issue reﬂect this diversity and can be, roughly, grouped into ﬁve topical categories. The papers of
Branch and McGough and Assenza and Berardi explore the implications of heterogeneous agents
in standard macroeconomic settings. The papers of Anufriev and Panchenko, Franke, and Kozhan
and Salmon examine the implications for interacting heterogeneous agents in ﬁnance. The papers
of Heemeijer et al. and Sutan and Willinger turn to experimental settings for evidence in favor of
heterogeneous agents models. The papers of Blume and Easley and Cherkashin et al. look at the
role of wealth evolution in the market with endogenous prices. A paper of Marsili et al. adopts the
statistical econophysics approach to ﬁnancial market data.
Lawrence Blume and David Easley extend their earlier work in Blume and Easley (1992, 2006).
The current paper analyses a dynamic model with rational traders who allocate part of their wealth
to the ﬁnancial market. Asset prices, as well as the agents’ wealth, are endogenously determined.
An important feature of the model is that even though the traders are utility-maximizing, they
have heterogeneous, incorrect beliefs. An intriguing question about the role of markets in such
heterogeneous populations then arises: will the market somehow “balance” the heterogeneous beliefs
of all diﬀerent traders and lead to market prices more accurate than individual beliefs? Or, will
the market “select” some traders, perhaps those with more accurate beliefs, and market prices will
come to reﬂect the (possibly) misspeciﬁed beliefs of these traders? The Blume and Easley model
supports the second view. In particular, it implies that assets could be mispriced even in a complete
markets setting populated by rational traders. Blume and Easley extend their previous paper to
allow for the market survival of multiple agents and demonstrate that the necessary conditions for
survival of a single agent are not suﬃcient in the multiple agents setting. They then provide the
appropriate suﬃcient conditions.
In the contribution by William Branch and Bruce McGough heterogeneous expectations are
introduced into a New Keynesian monetary model. The New Keynesian model is a micro founded
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and “New Keynesian Phillips Curve.” This model assumes monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, who
update their prices occasionally and in a staggered fashion (e.g. Calvo). The ﬁrms are owned by
households who decide on their lifetime consumption and bond holdings. Branch and McGough
replace the assumption of homogeneous expectations by assuming there are a continuum of two
diﬀerent types of agents, each with diﬀerent methods with which they form their expectations. The
agents in these models seek to satisfy their intertemporal Euler equations, which depend on their
particular forecasting mechanism, and their perceived budget constraints. Branch and McGough
provide a set of axioms for heterogeneous beliefs that yields an aggregation of individual consump-
tion, bond holdings, and price-setting that has the same reduced-form as the New Keynesian model
under rational expectations, only with the expectations operator replaced by a convex combination
of heterogeneous expectations operators. As an example of the implications of these results, it is
shown that a model with agents split between rational and adaptive agents can have important ram-
iﬁcations for monetary policy: in models where policy is set to ensure a unique rational expectations
equilibrium may lead to multiple equilibria under heterogeneous expectations.
Peter Heemeijer, Cars Hommes, Joep Sonnemans, and Jan Tuinstra adopt an experimental
framework to test whether agents are heterogeneous, and whether that heterogeneity is stable or
tends to diminish over time. They place subjects in a laboratory through a variety of simple market
experiments where in some treatments the feedback onto price is positive (e.g. asset pricing models)
and others it is negative (e.g. cobweb). In Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) it was shown that if
agents are heterogeneous, and the degree of heterogeneity responds to past predictor performance,
then the market dynamics may be complex. The experimental framework of Heemeijer, et al.,
is a natural setting to test these previous theoretical ﬁndings. The contribution in this special
issue shows that under negative feedback experiments prices converge quickly to their rational
expectations values. Under positive feedback, persistent deviations from the rational expectations
price occur frequently. Heemeijer, et al., explain this ﬁnding by noting that positive feedback models
reward speculative behavior and make coordination less likely than negative feedback models, where
deviating from the equilibrium can cause wide swings in market prices away from traders’ forecasts.
Mikhail Anufriev and Valentyn Panchenko focus on how the institutional features of a ﬁnancial
market may impact the interaction of heterogeneous agents who form their trading strategy based
on simple forecasting rules. Most ﬁnancial market models assume the existence of a Walrasian
auctioneer who clears the demand and supply of ﬁnancial assets. In the landmark paper by Brock
and Hommes (1997, 1998), it was shown that if market participants form their demand for assets by
selecting from a set of parsimonious forecasting rules then the price dynamics may be unstable and
complex. Anufriev and Panchenko address the degree to which this unrealistic, but tractable, market
assumption aﬀects the instability results. In addition to a Walrasian auctioneer, this contribution
assesses the implications of interacting heterogeneous agents under diﬀerent micro-structures such
as price- and order- driven markets. Surprisingly, even though trade in order-driven markets is
typically thought to be less stable than Walrasian markets, Anufriev and Panchenko ﬁnd that
when agents switch between fundamentalist and chartist trading strategies based on relative proﬁt
performance, the order-driven markets tend to be more stable. With a suﬃciently high sensitivity
to relative proﬁt diﬀerences, the order-driven markets may still be unstable and yield complex price
3and order dynamics. The authors explain this result by the interplay between agents’ heterogeneous
beliefs and the market micro-structure.
Similar to the contribution by Blume and Easley, Dmitriy Cherkashin, Doyne Farmer and Seth
Lloyd are interested in the implications of the competition between diﬀerent investment strategies for
market outcomes. Their work allows for the possibility that strategy payoﬀs depend on the aggregate
behavior of agents, as is the case in many economic situations with feedback between actions and
outcomes. Cherakshin, et al., formalize this situation as a betting game. They distinguish between
“self-defeating” games where the objective probability of an event decreases with the amount of
wealth bet on this event (i.e. negative feedback) and “self-reinforcing” games where the objective
probability of an event increases with the betting amount (i.e. positive feedback) Their paper
illustrates the long-run outcomes of such a game, i.e., the wealth distribution of players and the
strategy payoﬀs, and they provide results on the speed of convergence. As an extension, the authors
then investigate the eﬀect of the presence of a hyper-rational player who knows the strategies of
other players together with their wealth distribution. Finally, adopting as a measure of eﬃciency
the absence of proﬁtable opportunities, they ﬁnd that over time the game becomes more eﬃcient,
but convergence is slow. It is especially slow in the self-reinforcing games.
Roman Kozhan and Mark Salmon take the interacting heterogeneous agent approach to the
data on exchange rates. One long-standing puzzle in exchange rate models is why it is diﬃcult
for any model to forecast better than a pure random walk model of exchange rates. Kozhan and
Salmon argue that any representative agent model will fail to outperform a random walk model
unless the model imposes time-varying risk premia. Instead, this contribution assumes that agents
are heterogeneous in their forecasting model and in their utility functions. Foreign exchange traders
choose a forecasting model that is either based on fundamentals or by extrapolating trends (chartist).
Kozhan and Salmon observe that one rationale for selecting a forecasting rule is because traders
are uncertain about the true underlying process, and argue that agents should incorporate this
uncertainty into their decision making along the lines of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Thus, in the
Kozhan-Salmon model traders also decide whether to be uncertainty neutral or uncertainty averse
(e.g. max-min expected utility). The paper then turns to whether there is evidence in the foreign
exchange market for heterogeneity in beliefs and whether uncertainty aversion is an important part
of the puzzle. They ﬁnd that there is heterogeneity, that fundamentalists tend to be uncertainty
neutral, and a fraction of chartists are uncertainty averse. These empirical ﬁndings suggest that
future work in foreign exchange rate prediction should focus on models with heterogeneous agents.
Angela Sutan and Marc Willinger use an experimental setting to study the eﬀect of positive and
negative feedback in beauty contest games. Participants in their experiments are asked to guess a
number between 0 and 100, the winner will be the one whose guess is closest to the average guess. In
a positive feedback setting, the payoﬀ is increasing in the mean guess, while in a negative feedback
experiment it is decreasing. Sutan and Willinger ﬁnd that in negative feedback environments, the
experimental ﬁndings are closer to the rational expectations outcome then in positive feedback
environment. The intuition for this ﬁnding is similar to Heemeijer, et al.
Reiner Franke analyses an asset pricing model with three types of agents: fundamentalists, trend-
followers and a market-maker. Although, there is a large literature with heterogeneous traders in
asset markets, there has been much less focus on the evolution of the market-maker’s inventories.
4To design a simple, prototype model, where such eﬀects could be studied, Franke incorporates
a heterogeneous agent framework into the Beja and Goldman (1980). The resulting model in
continuous time is analyzed both analytically and numerically, and the stability properties for
various parameter conﬁgurations is presented.
The contribution by Tiziana Assenza and Michele Berardi focus on the eﬀect heterogeneity
can have in a model of credit cycles. Assenza and Berardi alter the seminal Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) credit model to incorporate out-of-equilibrium dynamics and heterogeneous expectations.
The Kiyotaki and Moore model assumes two types of agents, farmers (who borrow) and gatherers
(who lend). Because of limited enforcement in the event of default, the lenders impose collateral
constraints on farmers. Kiyotaki and Moore assume agents are homogeneous in their beliefs and
have perfect foresight. In a Kiyotaki-Moore perfect foresight equilibrium, there is no default and
farmers use their loans to invest in their land. Assenza and Berardi instead assume that farmers
and lenders have an adaptive learning rule, and the forecasts from these rules may be diﬀerent.
Assenza and Berardi allow default by letting farmers borrow and then use the proceeds from the
loan for consumption whenever their own perception of the return to investing is less than the cost
to repaying the loan. Because farmers and gatherers may have diﬀerent beliefs, gatherers may be
willing to lend to farmers without anticipating the ensuing default. Thus, heterogeneity in beliefs
could account for default in settings where there is no default under rational expectations.
Matteo Marsili, Giacomo Raﬀaelli and Benedicte Ponsot provide a (potential) explanation of
two ﬁnancial market “stylized facts”: an excessive correlation of stock prices and non-stationarity of
ﬁnancial asset correlations. The paper starts with presenting new evidence in favor of these empirical
ﬁndings and then focuses on an ad hoc model for the price dynamics in a market with diﬀerent
types of traders: fundamentalists, noise traders, trend-followers and a market-maker. In contrast
with a standard economic approach and in the spirit of (phenomenological) models of physics, the
mathematical structure of the pricing equation is directly assumed in this model and kept as simple
as possible to be just suﬃcient to explain the observed phenomena. Both through simulations and
analytic derivations, Marsili, Raﬀaelli and Ponsot show that the model can generate realistically
unstable dynamics of correlations for a large region in the parameter space, where the law of large
numbers cannot be applied to the agents’ adaptive estimation of the risk and return. The analysis
of factors contributing to instability is then straight-forward and informative. The authors show
that the region of instability expands with an increase of the volume traded, an increase of the
across-assets correlation and, surprisingly, with an increase of the targeted return. On the other
hand, the presence of the unstable region does not depend on the risk measure used.
To conclude, the 10 papers in this special issue demonstrate that heterogeneous agent models
have distinct theoretical, experimental, and empirical ﬁndings from rational expectations.
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